methods of empirical sciences to settle the controversy, focusing mostly on the issue of compatibilism between moral responsibility (or free will) and determinism. The results have been all but straightforward. Not only do efforts to assess whether 'the folk' have compatibilist tendencies suggest that the folk are at least as divided as philosophers, they also suggest that responsibility judgments are affected by a number of factors that philosophers have rarely if ever considered as directly relevant to moral responsibility, such as a target action's tendency to trigger emotional reactions, the level of concrete detail by which the action is described and whether it is set in this world or in an alternative universe, to name a few.
2 A variety of explanations have been suggested for individual results, but we still lack a satisfactory analysis of the everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of the full spectrum. In light of the puzzling results, one might suspect that there is no such explanation:
perhaps the common sense notion of moral responsibility is fundamentally disjunctive, telling us to apply different criteria for different kinds of scenarios; or perhaps different people have different concepts of moral responsibility. 4 Alternatively, one might suspect that the variety of folk intuitions stems from confusion: perhaps incompatibilist intuitions are due to conflation of determinism and fatalism or conflation of reductionism and eliminativism, or perhaps compatibilist intuitions are due to our general ignorance of the complete causes of our motives and decisions. 5 More charitably, one might suspect that various moral or 2 Experimental studies of judgments of moral responsibility have recently received attention in Science (Nichols 2011 ), a further indication of the non-esoteric nature of the problem.
3 See Nahmias 2005 Nahmias , 2007 Nichols and Knobe 2007; Feltz et al. 2009. 4 See e.g. Doris 2010, Feltz et al. 2009. 5 See Spinoza 1985 Spinoza [1677 ; Nahmias et al. 2007; Feltz et al. 2009 To decide whether these suspicions are correct, though, it is not enough to look at intuitions concerned with one narrow range of cases. We need recourse to a comprehensive empirically based theory of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, supported by a wide range of considerations. This is exactly what we hope to provide in this paper. In what follows, we will show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides surprisingly straightforward explanations of the more significant results in experimental philosophy. According to this hypothesis-the 'Explanation Hypothesis'-the judgment that an agent is morally responsible for an event is an explanatory judgment saying, very roughly, that a relevant motivational structure of the agent is part of a significant explanation of the event. Because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis promises to account for the varying tendencies revealed by recent empirical studies, among those our diverging tendencies towards compatibilism and incompatibilism. If it succeeds, there is a unified notion of moral responsibility behind the bewildering variety of intuitions among laymen and philosophers alike.
Elsewhere, we argue that the truth of the Explanation Hypothesis would provide strong reasons to reject incompatibilist or more generally skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. But whether that claim is true or not, the hypothesis provides a richer understanding of folk intuitions and a better basis for distinguishing reliable from mistaken intuitions than the schematic forms of compatibilism and incompatibilism that have been subjected to experimental empirical tests.
6 See e.g. Nelkin 2007: 256-257 n25; Warmke 2011. 4 GUNNAR.BJORNSSON@PHILOS.UMU.SE
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the Explanation Hypothesis, outlining its basic rationale. In section 3, we indicate some of the phenomena that it accounts for, and some direct empirical support from studies that we have conducted ourselves. In sections 4 and 5, we will look at further empirical data and show how the account of this set provided by the Explanation Hypothesis is either more straightforward or deeper and more detailed than earlier suggestions. In sections 6 we deal with possibly troubling data. In section 7, finally, we take stock and outline how some of the controversies in the philosophical debate about moral responsibility should be understood if the Explanation Hypothesis is correct.
The Explanation Hypothesis
The Explanation Hypothesis is best understood as part of a more general account of practices of holding people responsible, of expressing indignation or praise, withholding or increasing cooperative behavior, and distributing punishments and rewards. Generally speaking, humans engage in these practices because we take an interest in providing and confirming social support for our normative expectations and values. This is clearly seen in paradigmatic instances of second-person blame, which involve expressing disapproval to someone who has caused harm or violated normative expectations. It is a striking fact that such disapproval typically is placated by the agent's display of willingness to live up to the expectations, while increased by a steadfast refusal to change. First-and third-personal varieties of blame are equally revealing. In the former, feelings of guilt motivate adjustment of the agent's own behavior and values, and prompt expression of such motivation which, when acknowledged, mitigate feelings of guilt. In the latter, it is clear that the person who is blaming often seeks confirmation of her own disapproval in expressions of similar attitudes from others. Such Consider two facts about these practices of holding responsible. The first is that they need guidance to reliably reinforce the relevant expectations and motivational structures:
they need to target the right kind of motivational structure at the right time under the right circumstances. The second is that these practices are in fact directly guided by our judgments of moral responsibility: we tend to hold people responsible only insofar as we think that they are responsible. Guiding blame, condemnation, praise, punishments and rewards is arguably the signal psychological function of these judgments. Correspondingly, the signal psychological function of our concept of moral responsibility-of our psychological capacity 7 For the social and evolutionary function of emotions that dispose humans to engage in pro-social punishment (i.e. of indignation), see e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fehr 2004 , and Jaffe and Zaballa 2010. For a nuanced philosophical description of first and second person blame and its psychological role, see Bennett 2002 .
The claim here is not that practices of holding people responsible are consciously directed at reinforcing or modifying motivational structures, merely that they are generally structured so as to achieve that goal, be it by instrumental reasoning or instinct shaped by biological or social evolution. It is remarkable that even people whose acts of holding responsible are explicitly aimed at retributive justice rather than the protection of a social system are often highly interested in the public confirmation of support of certain values.
We are also not claiming that our ordinary practices of holding people responsible are ideal for reinforcing normative expectations needed for good social life, merely that their performance of this function explains their existence and important aspects of their structure. 8 The pattern is perhaps less obvious in the positive case, as there is nothing quite like the escalations of blame seen in the second-person case when the agent fails to display guilt or remorse. to identify cases of moral responsibility-is to guide these practices of holding responsible by guiding our judgments of responsibility.
9
The suggestion, in light of these facts, is that our concept of moral responsibility plays the role it plays because it tracks conditions under which it works to hold someone responsible for something. It is of course well known that responsibility judgments are insensitive to a variety of such conditions. We might judge that agents are responsible for something while thinking that holding them responsible would be counterproductive or pointless, perhaps because of our relations to the agents, or because they are contrarians, or long since dead. 10 But our responsibility judgments do seem to track three general preconditions for successfully holding people responsible for something.
First, unless a certain kind of motivational structure has a general tendency to be harmful, modifying it is of little use, and unless it has a general tendency to be beneficial, reinforcing that structure or encouraging emulation will do little good. Call this the TENDENCY condition.
Second, unless what we are holding agents responsible for is straightforwardly and saliently explained by their motivational structures on the given occasion, in accordance with the general tendency, holding them responsible is unlikely to result in modification or reinforcement of the relevant attitudes. To be ready to modify our ways, we need to see the harm as resulting from a lack of relevant motivational structures; to be strengthened in our structures in terms of amenability to modification by practices of holding responsible, rather than in terms of capacities to do otherwise, say, or in terms of volitional or rational control.
Nor does the broadly consequentialist etiological story that informs EH imply that attributions of responsibility are directly motivated by thoughts about the consequences of holding others responsible. More plausibly, our basic tendencies to hold responsible and responding to being held responsible develop from relatively primitive social emotional tendencies to aggression and social repair. Though these become successively more sophisticated in part because we learn about consequences of directing our emotional reactions in various ways, we continue to be directly governed by thoughts about whether someone brought about or allowed an event in a certain way.
15
In some ways, EH follows extant compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility (see e.g. 15 Because individual judgments of moral responsibility are typically made without an eye to the efficacy of holding someone responsible, they provide an independent constraint on the practices of holding responsible, sometimes yielding negative verdicts under conditions where the practices would work fine. In Björnsson and
Persson forthcoming and later in this paper, we explain why skeptical arguments and reflection on determinism are prone to produce such practice-undermining negative judgments. (A neighboring debate concerns whether the correctness of responsibility judgments is grounded in the practices or vice versa. For versions of the former view, see e.g. Strawson 1982 and Wallace 1994; for criticism, see Smith 2007.) 16 Björnsson (2011) argues that EH accounts for one sort of exception to this requirement in relation to collective responsibility. What EH and its etiological underpinnings contribute in the first place is a unified account of these conditions in terms of the psychological role of the concept of moral responsibility.
However, our focus here is on the explanations EH offers of a number of disparate and often philosophically puzzling aspects of our judgments of moral responsibility.
In the next section, we will say a little bit more about how the EXPLANATION condition should be understood, and mention some of the phenomena that EH has been used to explain, including results from a recent study designed to directly test the hypothesis. This provides independent motivation for the explanations that we will offer in later sections for recent bewildering empirical results.
Applying the Explanation Hypothesis
Many of the most interesting predictions and explanations generated by EH depend on the notion of a significant explanation of an event. The key feature of that notion is its selective nature. Suppose that we are asked why a house has just burned down. In answering, we could list a number of conditions, each of which might be a necessary part of a complex sufficient condition for the outcome: there was a thunderstorm; the house was hit by lightning an hour earlier; the house consisted largely of combustible matter; there was oxygen in the air; etc. All of these conditions might be part of a full causal story leading up to the fact that the house burned down, but only a small subset will stand out when we want to give a condensed explanation of that fact. When we do, the fact that the house was hit by lightning will likely grab our attention, whereas the fact that the house consisted of combustible matter or that there was oxygen in the air would be taken for granted as part of what we might call the explanatory 'background'. Typically, the explanatory background consists of conditions that are generally to be expected whereas attention grabbers are conditions that violate such expectations. Generally speaking, we expect houses to be built from some amount of combustible material, and we certainly expect there to be oxygen in the air, but we do not in the same way expect houses to be hit by lightning at some given time.
Everyday explanations are selective in other ways too. The bolt of lightning that hit the house itself had a causal genesis, and there were numerous causal intermediaries between the fact that the house was hit by lightning and the fact that it burned to the ground. These conditions are not likely to be seen as part of the explanans, however. When we explain an event, we cite conditions that provide a particularly telling explanation among those leading up to the event, conditions that satisfy our explanatory interests without immediately raising new and urgent why-questions. If we wonder why the house burned down and are told that the attic insulation caught fire, we will probably wonder why the insulation caught fire, and if we are told that there was a separation of positive and negative charges in the neighboring atmosphere, we are likely to ask how that explained that the house burned down. By contrast, if we are told that the house was hit by lightning, we will probably be satisfied: we take a house's being hit by lightning to be both the sort of thing that just happens and the sort of thing that causes houses to burn down.
Generally speaking, whether we understand something as a significant or relevant explanation depends on explanatory interests. If we ask a fire engineer why the house burned down, the fact that it was hit by lightening might be part of the explanatory background:
perhaps we want to know what was especially important about the construction of the house, or about the fire protection available or missing. Sometimes such interests are naturally explained in contrastive terms: perhaps we want to know why this house burned down when other houses that were also hit by lightning survived; in that case, we are looking for some Similarly, EH accounts for the fact that we sometimes, but not always, take ignorance to mitigate moral responsibility. When we are ignorant of a possible outcome of our actions, the degree to which we care about that outcome will typically not explain these actions.
However, sometimes failures to foresee an outcome are fairly straightforwardly explained by agents' motivational structures-perhaps, if the doctor had cared more about risks involved in various procedures, she would have known that the treatment was dangerous. In such cases we might nevertheless attribute responsibility for that outcome.
Interestingly, EH also explains why people can be seen as collectively responsible for outcomes over which they had no individual control. Many think that drivers of gas-guzzling SUVs are morally responsible for effects on the environment, even though no individual SUV's absence would have made a meaningful difference to those effects given the presence of the others. EH provides a straightforward explanation. People who attribute moral responsibility to these drivers think that the effects happened partly because these drivers cared too little about the environment. The explanation they have in mind makes collective reference to the motivational structures of the drivers, thus avoiding the problem that the motivational structure of the individual might have played no significant role taken on its own. This was indeed the result, as visible in Figure 1 . The figure represents all 463 pairs of answers, with the area of a bubble centered at a point representing number of pairs at that point, ranging from 1 to 73.
22 Figure 1 21 One should not expect a perfect match even on the assumption that subjects understood the questions in the relevant way, since the explanation question might fail to capture the motivational structure that a given subject would see as most explanatory, and since the badness of the outcome might factor into assessments of degrees of responsibility. 22 In numbers, the correlation (Pearson's r) across all 463 pairs was 0.71 and highly significant (N=463, p <.001); the reliability score (Cronbach's alpha) was 0.83. To test for interaction effects between the questions, other subjects were divided in two groups, each asked only one of the questions. Since the mean values for the two questions were closely matched for the four vignettes in this between-group experiment design, this test did not suggest any significant interaction. For details, see (Johansson 2010 ). This result, together with EH's etiological motivation and capacity to explain core features of our thinking about moral responsibility, gives EH the independent support needed to make plausible some of the explanations that we will propose. In the following sections, we will discuss a number of results from studies intended to reveal folk intuitions about moral responsibility, but we begin with philosophically less charged studies concerned with seemingly unrelated aspects of the attribution of blame. 
Asymmetric responsibilities for known side effects
A number of studies by Joshua Knobe and others suggest that people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the agent just does not care about these effects. 24 In one study, subjects were presented with either of two scenarios involving a chairman of a board who takes no interest in environmental effects of his decisions. In the first scenario, he knowingly allows a profitable program that harms the environment; in the other, he allows a profitable program that benefits the environment. Subjects in the harm condition assigned a high degree of blameworthiness (4.8 on a 0 to 6 scale) to the chairman, whereas subjects in the benefit condition assigned a very low (1.4) degree of praiseworthiness (Knobe 2003: 193 Since neither Knobe's original study nor follow-up studies in the literature ask explicitly about moral responsibility, one might suspect that the phenomenon has more to do with a contrast between blame and praise. 25 To test this, we ran studies in the same format asking explicitly whether the agent was morally responsible for the outcome. The results were virtually indistinguishable from those in Knobe's study. 26 Moreover, given that moral responsibility is generally seen as a precondition for blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, we might expect an explanation of the responsibility asymmetry to be more basic.
Various explanations of the side effect asymmetry have been suggested, most of which take the effect to rely on our normative understanding of the situation. 27 Appeals to normative expectations will also be part of a full EH account of the phenomenon, but the initial explanation is much simpler. When considering the harm scenario, it is natural to explain the harm to the environment in terms of the motivational structure of the chairman:
the environment was damaged because he did not care about such effects. When considering the benefit scenario, however, there is nothing comparable. For example, to say that the environment was helped because the chair did not actively try to harm the environment sounds decidedly less natural. Given EH, this difference in intuitive explanatory judgments straightforwardly accounts for the difference in responsibility judgments. 25 In general, attributions of blameworthiness, praiseworthiness are correlated but hardly identical. See e.g. Robbennolt 2000 , 2588 -83, Woolfolk et al 2006 For a scenario very similar to Knobe's chairman of the board scenario, mean moral responsibility for the harm was 5,3 with confidence interval at 95% = 4.9-5.7; for benefit 1.4 with confidence interval at 95% = 0.8-1.9 (33 subjects in each condition).
27 See Cole Wright and Bengson 2009, Knobe 2010 e.g..
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This is enough to show that EH can account for the asymmetry in responsibility judgments and, by extension, for the asymmetry in attributions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Moreover, all independent support for EH gives us independent reasons to think that this explanation asymmetry is what is actually at the heart of the matter. However, without an independent account of the explanation asymmetry, one might suspect that it depends on the responsibility asymmetry rather than the other way around.
As it happens, there is a rather straightforward account of the explanation asymmetry. In the harm condition, there are two reasons why the chair's lack of environmental concern will seem like a natural significant explanation: (i) people in general take it that indifference towards valuable things often explains harm to them, and (ii) the chair's indifference stands out in comparison to our normative expectation that people care appropriately, making it a significant explanation given a typical explanatory frame. Contrast this with the benefit condition. Here, there is no type of motivational structure exemplified by the chair that both (i) has a general tendency to explain outcomes of the relevant sort and (ii) stands out in the required way. For example, there seems to be no general tendency for indifference toward a valuable thing to benefit it, and no general tendency for an interest in profit to lead to benefits to the environment. One could perhaps say that states of not being opposed to X tend to explain why X happens, and also that the chair's not being actively opposed to benefits to the environment was necessary for the beneficial effects. Even granted this, however, the state of not being actively opposed to benefits to the environment conforms strongly to our normative expectations. It thus falls squarely into the explanatory background, along with the presence of oxygen in the company headquarters and the fact that the company had enough resources to run the program.
The suggestion, then, is that the explanation asymmetry and, by extension, the responsibility, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness asymmetries, are due to our normative 
Explaining incompatibilist intuitions, and their absence
Most of the philosophical concern with the everyday concept of moral responsibility comes from two features. On the one hand, the concept has a central role in moral thinking and everyday life; on the other, it also seems open to skeptical worries, in particular worries about the compatibility of responsibility with determinism or scientific explanations of our 28 This explanation is in line with some other explanations that have been proposed. Dana Nelkin (2007, 353) briefly suggests that the responsibility asymmetry might be due to asymmetries in our moral duties. The chair deserves blame in the harm condition because he violates a duty not to harm, whereas the chair in the benefit condition does not deserve praise for the beneficial consequences since it was not his intention to help. That suggestion seems consonant with the explanation developed here, although lacking in details about the connection between duties, blame-and praiseworthiness and moral responsibility. Knobe's own suggestion is that these asymmetries are at bottom a matter of whether people's attitudes fall short of (or exceed) a default set by normative expectations, much as we have argued (Knobe 2010; Pettit and Knobe 2009 ). But without an account of how defaults affect judgments, this seems to be no more than a promising hunch. What we have offered is exactly such an account: defaults affect what stands out from the explanatory background.
One remaining issue is to say how this account generalizes to related asymmetries revealed by other studies, in particular asymmetries in attributions of intentionality and related psychological states. Just as people are willing to attribute responsibility for the effect in the harm condition but not in the benefit condition, people are much more willing to say that the chair intentionally harmed, was in favor of harming, or decided to harm the environment in the former condition than they are to say that he intentionally helped, was in favor of helping, or decided to help the environment in the latter. Similarly, people are somewhat less reluctant to say, in the harm condition, that the chair increased profit by harming the environment, or that he harmed the environment in order to increase profit, than to say, in the benefit condition, that he increased profit by helping the environment, or that he helped the environment in order to increase profit (Pettit and Knobe 2009, e.g.) . It would be surprising if these asymmetries had completely different explanations, but we explain elsewhere how the account provided here extends to these other expressions (Björnsson in progress B) . Much as philosophers, lay people are divided between those who do and those who do not take responsibility to be undermined in deterministic scenarios, or by neurophysiological explanations of decisions. 29 This is interesting in itself, but so is the distribution of incompatibilist intuitions and features that affect these intuitions. We will begin this section by mentioning a number of interesting results that we find particularly clear, and then proceed to explain how they are accounted for by EH.
Most of the studies have been made using an experimental paradigm developed by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe (2007) , where subjects are asked questions after having read descriptions of one deterministic and one indeterministic universe. Here is the description of the former:
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the Other, somewhat similar, ways of presenting deterministic scenarios to subjects have been used in various studies, and there is some debate about which is most likely to get across a proper understanding of determinism. Some descriptions might not convey the relevant necessitation of later events by earlier conditions while others, including the description of Universe A above, risk inviting fatalistic rather than deterministic interpretations. For this reason, we see some of the following discussion as provisionary.
However, unlike some critics, we do not think that we now have grounds for attributing the findings that we will discuss here primarily to misinterpretation of deterministic scenarios.
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Here are some of the findings:
CROSS-CULTURAL ROBUSTNESS: When asked whether our universe is more like Universe A than Universe B, between 65% and 85% of subjects in the United States, India, Hong Kong and Columbia have given the indeterminist answer. Moreover, when asked whether, in Universe A, it is possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions, between 63% and 75% have given the incompatibilist answer. Across a variety of different cultural backgrounds, then, a majority of people seem to think that human decisions are not completely caused by the past, and a majority of people seem to think that determinism precludes moral responsibility (Sarkissian et al. 2010 ). This suggests that incompatibilist intuitions stem from some basic feature of our thinking about moral responsibility. At the 30 For some possible sources of error, see Sommers 2010, Nahmias and Murray 2010. The worries raised by Nahmias and Murray are based on particularly intriguing empirical results. We suspect that they can be accounted for within the framework provided by EH, but are undertaking studies to test this hypothesis.
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same time, a substantial portion of subjects give compatibilist answers, suggesting that although incompatibilist intuitions stem from some basic feature of the relevant concept of moral responsibility, there is no simple and obvious inferential rule that both constitutes competence with the concept and mandates incompatibilist judgments.
COMMITMENT TO MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: Although a substantial proportion of subjects make incompatibilist judgments about deterministic scenarios, few people give both determinist and incompatibilist answers. Moreover, when subjects in a study by Adina Roskies and Shaun Nichols (2008) were asked to assume that our actual universe is deterministic, they were significantly more inclined to ascribe moral responsibility to agents than were subjects considering agents in a merely possible universe. Like the presence of a substantial minority willing to attribute full moral responsibility to agents in Universe A, these results suggests that our everyday understanding of the concept of moral responsibility, although prone to give rise to incompatibilist intuitions, does not straightforwardly commit us to incompatibilism. At the very least, it seems that any incompatibilist aspects of the concept can be overridden by a commitment to moral responsibility in the actual world (Roskies and Nichols 2008: 378-387) .
31
CONCRETE VS. ABSTRACT: Studies by Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in a deterministic scenario depends on whether these actions are described abstractly or concretely. Subjects in the 'abstract' condition were asked whether, in Universe A, it is possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for his or her actions, whereas subjects in the 'concrete' condition were asked 31 The study reported in Nahmias et al 2007: 227 complicates the picture somewhat: the tendency reported by
Roskies and Nichols holds for scenarios of psychological determinism, but is reversed for scenarios of neurological or reductionist determinism. Nahmias et al 2007: 227) . 32 The puzzle is to explain why people assign responsibility in the concrete but not in the abstract condition when the universe is portrayed the same way in both.
Nichols and Knobe hypothesized that affect evoked by the deeds depicted in the concrete case influences judgment, and tested this by presenting 'high affect' and 'low affect' cases presented against a deterministic background scenario. In the high affect case, a man stalks and rapes a stranger; in the low affect case, a man cheats on his taxes. When subjects were presented with the high affect case they where more inclined to ascribe full moral responsibility (64%) than when they were presented with the low affect scenario (23%) (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 675-676) . The question, again, is why this is so.
EXPLANATIONS IN TERMS OF MOTIVES VERSUS PRIOR CAUSES:
In a study by Adam Feltz and colleagues (Feltz et al. forthcoming) , subjects read a description of a deterministic world (departing slightly from the Nichols and Knobe paradigm) in which John kills his wife to marry his lover. They were then asked to score their agreement with the claim that John was morally responsible for killing his wife, and later asked to explain John's action. Those who 32 Judgments of responsibility about concrete actions in a variety of deterministic scenarios seem to yield similar numbers (Nahmias et al 2006) . 33 Results in Feltz 2009 gives some cause for concern about these results. Each subject in their study were confronted with both high affect and low affect scenarios, and 92% gave the same answer in both. (According to Adam Feltz (personal communication) , the remaining 8%, 4 subjects, attributed responsibility in the high affect case but not in the low affect case.) However, although this study did not display any order effect for the two condition were confronted with a deterministic scenario in which neuroscientists have discovered the chemical reactions and neural processes in our brains that completely cause our decisions and actions, and are themselves completely caused by events preceding our births. Subjects in the 'non-reductionist' condition were instead confronted with a scenario in which psychologists had discovered the thoughts, desires and plans in our minds that completely cause our decisions and actions, and are themselves caused by events preceding our births.
When subjects were asked to what extent they agreed that people should be held responsible for their actions if the relevant form of determinism were true, the level of agreement was significantly lower among subjects in the reductionist condition: 41% agreed at least somewhat, as compared to 89% in the non-reductionist condition (Nahmias et. al. scenarios, it also did not prevent subjects from reading both scenarios before answering and adjusting their answers to achieve consistency (ibid. 8-9). precisely: the only ordering of explanatory significance is that earlier events explain later events, making the initial state of the universe the most significant explanans. In everyday contexts, where our explanatory interests are more concrete, more proximal explanations are often much more significant, as prior causes are less straightforwardly connected to the explanandum. Recall: the fact that lightning struck the house provides a more straightforward explanation of why the house burned down than does the fact that there was a separation of positive and negative charge in the neighboring atmosphere, even if the latter explains the lightning.
The effect of introducing the deterministic scenario is thus to strongly invite use of the more abstract explanatory frame in which agents' motivational structures are not seen as significant explanations of their actions. Insofar as we accept that invitation while judging 34 The difference was considerably lower when asked about a foreign planet inhabited by creatures whose lives and societies resemble ours, and also considerably lower when asked about concrete actions. whether agents in the deterministic scenario are responsible for their actions, EH predicts that we will no longer see these agents as responsible. This explains why subjects who are asked whether agents can be fully morally responsible in Universe A tend to give a negative answer. 35 However, although the deterministic scenario invites an abstract perspective, subjects might resist the invitation, instead employing folk-psychological explanatory models that account for decisions and actions in terms of desires, values and preferences.
Since folk-psychological models are likely to be easily accessible, it is not surprising that the incompatibilist tendency, although strong, is limited.
For these reasons, we think that sensitivity to explanatory frames can explain why judgments of moral responsibility are subject to strong tendencies towards incompatibilist intuitions, without incompatibilism being part of the concept of moral responsibility. But it also provides explanations of the other results listed above.
First, to the extent that similar practices of holding responsible are part of all the cultures in which intuitions have been tested using the Nichols and Knobe paradigm, and given the etiological story motivating EH, we should expect subjects in all these cultures to employ a concept of the same sort.
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Second, given the central everyday role of explanatory models in which motivational structures are significant and the central social role of practices of holding responsible, we should expect a psychological commitment to attributions of moral responsibility. We should 35 It also explains the strong tendency to give positive answers when asked the same question about agents in Universe B: in one study, between 89% and 95% subjects said that agents in Universe B could be fully morally responsible (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 676) . Since decision-making in this universe is said not to be completely caused by prior events, it cannot be fully explained within the abstract frame. This invites reliance on our most salient, folk-psychological, explanatory models for explanations of actions and decisions. thus not expect people who think that the world is deterministic to make their responsibility judgments employing the abstract deterministic model: that would involve distancing oneself from one's dispositions to blame and praise people in the actual world.
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Third, the EH explanation of incompatibilist intuitions also explains why questions about agents' responsibility for concrete actions are less likely to trigger incompatibilist intuitions. Given a concrete action and perhaps even a concrete motive, folk-psychological explanatory models that are dependent on such details will provide more salient alternative to the abstract deterministic explanatory model.
Fourth, EH provides a straightforward explanation of why subjects more readily ascribe responsibility in 'high affect' cases than in 'low affect' cases. Since a serious transgression strongly violates our expectations, it is exactly the sort of event that calls for an explanation, and more precisely an explanation telling us why it happened here but not in cases where the expectations are satisfied. The explanatory model provided by the deterministic scenario cannot answer that call as it provides the same abstract explanation for cases that violate and cases that satisfy expectations: both kinds are fully caused by prior events. By contrast, an appeal to the agent's motivational structure provides a salient possible explanation: the violation happened in this case because the agent didn't care appropriately about the relevant values, in the way people typically do when they satisfy expectations. What we suggest, then, is that 'high affect' cases trigger responsibility judgments even among subjects primed with an abstract deterministic explanatory model because they call for explanations that can only be given by abandoning the abstract model. Since the weaker transgressions of 'low 37 Of course, such distancing is part of certain religious and spiritual practices, but these are avowedly esoteric. Fifth, the EH explanation of incompatibilist intuitions straightforwardly predicts that people who explain actions in terms of agents' reasons, thoughts and desires will attribute higher degrees of responsibility than those who explain actions in terms of other sorts of causes.
Finally, EH explains why a reductive, neurological, deterministic scenario undermines judgments of responsibility much more strongly than a non-reductive, psychological deterministic scenario. Again, the reason is that the former is more likely to prompt explanatory frames that do not invoke the motivational structures of the agent. In the reductive scenario, we are not only lead to adopt a new set of explanatory categories (chemical and neurological processes) but also, perhaps, to discard our everyday explanations of human action (depending on whether reductionist explanations are seen as conflicting with those), whereas the explanatory categories postulated in the non-reductive scenario coincide with those employed in folk-psychological explanations.
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38 Explanations of the 'affect' asymmetry proposed by Nichols and Knobe (2007: 671-73) give affect a central explanatory role. An explanation based on EH could do that too, if affect prompted focus on the agent's motivational structures over and above that effected by violations of normative expectations. However, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that affect plays no major role in explaining compatibilist intuitions about 'high affect' cases (see Cova, Bertoux et al. forthcoming) , evidence favoring non-affective accounts like the one proposed here.
39 This explanation also tells us why the distinction between a psychological and a neurological explanation has no effect on attributions of moral responsibility when, unlike in the Nahmias et al. (2007) 41 This would fit with the familiar idea that an agent is acting 'of her own free will' in the sense relevant for moral responsibility if the motivational structures that govern her action are ones that the she wants to be governed by:
this is exactly what is missing in the unwilling addict or compulsive kleptomaniac. (Much contemporary work in this tradition departs from Frankfurt 1971 .) The twist, of course, is that in this case, the governing motivational structures are those of someone else. First, when subjects were asked to assess whether Bill was 'free to do other than he did' on a 1 to 7 scale, the mean was 1.98 (Woolfolk et al. 2006: 296-297) . This suggests that subjects did not uniformly see the compliance drug as an absolute constraint, making it possible for them to think that Bill's motivational structures played some role in explaining why Bill shot Frank. Moreover, the mean score in the high identification condition was only 1 unit lower than in the 'low identification' condition where Bill did not want to kill Frank:
3.25 rather than 2.25 on the 1 to 7 scale. If subjects did not see the compliance drug as an absolute constraint, this comparatively small difference could well have resulted from the attribution of some explanatory significance to Bill's motivational state in the high identification condition.
Second, although subjects were asked about Bill's responsibility for Frank's death, they might have ascribed some degree of responsibility in order to express disapproval of Bill's endorsement of the events in the high identification condition. This is not a mere theoretical possibility: in our own studies, subjects' free form explanations of their responsibility attributions show that quite a few confound responsibility for outcomes with responsibility for decisions preceding the outcomes, leading them to attribute responsibility for outcomes 
Reframing the debate
We should stress again that the discussions in the preceding sections is somewhat tentative.
Some of the empirical results that we have discussed come from studies with relatively few subjects, and some of the questionnaires used might contain unfortunate formulations. At this time, however, we have not seen convincing positive reason to doubt that the phenomena that we have tried to explain are real. Moreover, each of the explanations provided here gains considerable support from EH's capacity to account for wide variety of other aspects of our thinking about moral responsibility. This is not to deny that more studies are needed to work out in greater detail how responsibility judgments interact with explanatory frames, but we think that such studies can be fruitfully guided by EH. For example, we think that it will be fruitful to look more closely at various further factors that affect explanatory judgments and see whether they affect responsibility attributions.
Similarly, it will be interesting to see to what extent different intuitive ways of individuating motivational structure types might affect attributions of moral responsibility, as EH predicts.
Given EH, it is also a highly interesting question to what extent laymen are variously committed to specific explanatory frames in ways that make their intuitive judgments of moral responsibility resistant to the various framing effects that we have considered. 
